



**Measuring and mapping displacement: the problem of quantification in the battle against gentrification**

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## Measuring and mapping displacement: the problem of quantification in the battle against gentrification

### Abstract

Debates concerning residential population displacement in the context of gentrification remain vociferous, but are hampered by a lack of empirical evidence of the extent of the displacement occurring. The lack of quantitative evidence on gentrification-induced displacement and the difficulties in collecting it has long hampered the fight against it. Based on a systematic review of quantitative studies of the displacement associated with gentrification, this paper considers how researchers have attempted to measure displacement using a range of statistical and mapping techniques reflecting the multidimensional character of gentrification. We note that these techniques often struggle to provide meaningful estimates of the number of individuals and households displaced by gentrification, something compounded by the lack of data available on a sufficiently granular temporal and spatial scale. Noting the limitations of extant methods, we conclude by considering the potential of more novel data sources and emergent methods involving the processing of larger amounts of (micro)data, as well as participatory GIS methods that involve affected communities themselves. This implies that whilst the quantitative study of displacement remains difficult, patterns and processes of displacement can be inferred through existing data sources, as well as data generated from those who themselves have experienced displacement.

**Keywords:** Displacement, gentrification, housing, method, neighbourhood, redevelopment, regeneration.

### Introduction

Debates about the effects of gentrification have always been highly-polarised, with terms chosen to describe the processes involved politically-loaded: what some regard as *displacement* (Hartman, 1980), *domicide* (Porteous and Smith, 2001) or *social cleansing* (Cameron, 2003), others describe more benignly as *replacement* (Hamnett, 2003) or *relocation* (Kearns and Mason, 2013). Crucially, how socioeconomic change in a neighbourhood is interpreted, conceptualised and measured is critical to whether we find population displacement, how much

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3 of it we find, and whether it is perceived to be problematic (Bernt and Holm, 2009). As a result,  
4 the focus on displacement (and those displaced) has a patchy history in the gentrification  
5 literature, with recent commentary lamenting the effective “displacement” of displacement'  
6 (Helbrecht, 2018:2). In many ways, this has allowed governments, policy-makers and planners  
7 to pursue strategies of gentrification unchallenged by statistical evidence of what is often  
8 mooted as its most negative impact: the displacement of long-term residents (Atkinson, 2000).  
9 As such, ‘[t]he conceptualisation of displacement...has enormous political implications’ (Bernt  
10 and Holm, 2009: 313), as does how it is measured - its quantification.  
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19 In this paper we examine empirical research that has attempted to quantify displacement, a field  
20 dominated by studies which attempt to measure migration to or from ‘dwellings’ within given  
21 neighbourhoods across a fixed time period. Such studies are typically based on a  
22 unidimensional conceptualisation of direct, measurable displacement underpinned by a  
23 Cartesian notion of space (Marcuse, 1986; Davidson, 2008). Such an interpretation arguably  
24 fails to measure either the psychosocial ties which bind people to places (Davidson, 2009), the  
25 effort or sacrifice that lower income residents may make in order to *remain* in their homes in  
26 gentrifying areas (Newman and Wyly, 2006) or the limitations that gentrification may place  
27 upon their future residential choices (Slater, 2009). Ignoring these dimensions means the  
28 displacement impacts of gentrification may be significantly underestimated (Millard-Ball,  
29 2002).  
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39 Notwithstanding such conceptual issues, in this paper we focus on the more practical problems  
40 bedeviling conventional measures of displacement: the lack of appropriate longitudinal data  
41 with which to measure housing turnover, rent increases, migration destinations or tenurial  
42 change at regular intervals has been a longstanding obstacle in this field (Atkinson, 2000). The  
43 purpose of this paper is hence to review the quantitative methodologies deployed to measure  
44 the extent of gentrification-induced displacement. The terms of reference for the review have  
45 been restricted to residential property-led gentrification, as opposed to the displacement  
46 resulting from, for example, industrial or retail gentrification<sup>1</sup>. The paper begins by briefly  
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55 <sup>1</sup> An initial search on ‘gentrification and displacement’ on Web of Science captured 87 journal  
56 articles published between 1970 and 2017, plus a few additional conference proceedings and  
57 editorials. The search was then restricted to English language papers only and articles were  
58 screened for inclusion on the basis that they included quantitative research and measurement  
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3 outlining the key academic debates on gentrification and displacement in order to set the context  
4 of the review. It then reviews some of the principal quantitative approaches to studying  
5 gentrification-induced displacement before exploring some important limitations of this  
6 literature relating to the choice of data sources, spatial units and time scales. While most of the  
7 relevant literature focuses on the US or UK, the review also explores more recent research  
8 undertaken in Europe and beyond.  
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### 18 **Identifying neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification**

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21 Studies of gentrification-induced displacement often presuppose the accurate identification of  
22 neighbourhoods having experienced gentrification. This is important in relation to measuring  
23 displacement, as neighbourhoods *not* undergoing gentrification are frequently used as baseline  
24 comparators for displacement in neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification. Unfortunately,  
25 although the broad dimensions of gentrification are often agreed (see Davidson and Lees, 2005,  
26 for a contemporary definition), the *operationalization* of these dimensions in terms of  
27 measurable variables are far more equivocal. As an illustration, Galster and Peacock (1986)  
28 operationalized gentrification by constructing several logistic least-squares regression models  
29 using different census variables for Philadelphia (1970-80). Their key finding was that variable  
30 selection had a significant impact on which, and how many, census tract areas were defined as  
31 neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification:  
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40 'Our empirical analysis of Philadelphia showed unambiguously that how one  
41 defines gentrification crucially affects which and how many tracts are  
42 identified as having undergone gentrification, and which characteristics of  
43 those tracts appear to hold the greatest explanatory power for such changes. The  
44 sensitivity of these important conclusions to both the definitional criterion  
45 used and the stringency with which it is applied is apparent' (Galster and Peacock, 1986:  
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55 of gentrification-related displacement; in the end 27 articles were included in the review. In  
56 several cases the quantitative strand was part of mixed methods research. It remains notable  
57 that there are many more qualitative than quantitative publications on gentrification-induced  
58 displacement. We updated this list with 2018 journal articles.  
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3 Similar tendencies are noted in Barton's (2016) application of contrasting census-based models  
4 from Bostic and Martin (2003) and Freeman (2005) to identify neighbourhoods undergoing  
5 gentrification in New York City, comparing these to the results of a content analysis of  
6 gentrification stories in *The New York Times*. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these different methods  
7 identified wildly different sets of neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification.  
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13 In the light of the multi-dimensional character of gentrification it would then seem preferable  
14 to identify neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification using a combination of variables, or at  
15 least to undertake sensitivity-testing for different univariate proxies. Freeman (2005: 469-470),  
16 for example, made use of variables corresponding to:  
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- 19 i. city centre location;
  - 20 ii. relatively low income (compared to median for the metropolitan area);
  - 21 iii. older housing stock (measured through low rate-of new-build - although this is not  
22 necessarily the same as old ie. Victorian stock);
  - 23 iv. an increase in higher mean educational level than for metropolitan area;
  - 24 v. a steeper increase in house (owner-occupied) prices.
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32 Other examples of a multi-dimensional operationalisation are provided by Maciag (2015) and  
33 Desmond and Gershenson (2017), with the latter seeking to test the relationship between  
34 eviction and gentrification by studying households on a low median income at the start of the  
35 study period (2000) and exploring increases in mean educational level and median home values  
36 over time. They also included other variables that may be correlated with gentrification such as  
37 non-white population<sup>2</sup> and concentrated disadvantage (see also Holm and Schulz, 2018, who  
38 modelled neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification in Berlin).  
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45 Following the work of Hammel and Wyly (1996), Walks and Maaranen (2008) developed a  
46 similar method for identifying neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification using principal  
47 components analysis (PCA). They applied this to four variables (mean individual income, the  
48 proportion of tenants, socioeconomic status based on employment rate and  
49 professionals/managers, and the percentage of artists resident in an area), field-testing their  
50 results by checking with local experts in three Canadian cities. More recently, Reades et al.  
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57 <sup>2</sup> But note that the non-white population is only correlated with gentrification at the baseline,  
58 not at the end of the process.  
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3 (2018) employed machine learning methods in an attempt to relate neighbourhood ascent in  
4 London (measured using four indicators) to 166 different variables, including environmental  
5 measures of proximity to green spaces and mean travel times to central London. Their work  
6 suggests that data-driven and probabilistic models may be more useful in the description and  
7 prediction of gentrification than the spatial, rule-based models more commonplace in urban  
8 systems modelling (see also Zhou, 2018). This is because there is a complex range of possible  
9 relationships between social and environmental variables that can unfold in different  
10 neighbourhoods, with attempts to predict change in a neighbourhood based on the state of  
11 adjacent ones unlikely to yield accurate prediction of change (Royall and Wortmann, 2015). Of  
12 course there is a difference between research that is trying to identify gentrifying  
13 neighbourhoods and research that is trying to predict gentrification. The implications of  
14 gentrification scholars trying to predict possible trajectories of neighbourhood change re. the  
15 process could well be exploited by those in search of rent gaps, indeed the ethical implications  
16 have yet to be debated.  
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### 31 **Measures of gentrification-induced displacement**

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33 Accepting that displacement is much harder to detect than gentrification (Elliot-Cooper,  
34 Hubbard and Lees, 2019), here we consider attempts to measure displacement initially  
35 developed in the context of gentrification studies. Notably, early studies concerned with  
36 gentrification and displacement from the 1950s to the 1970s focused on post war, state-led,  
37 slum clearance programmes. For example, estimates of the post-war slum clearances based on  
38 data from the UK Ministry of Housing and Local Government suggests that around 4 million  
39 properties housing the best part of 15 million people were demolished between 1955-1985  
40 (Tunstall and Lowe, 2012).<sup>3</sup> US state programmes of urban 'renewal' in the 1950s and 1960s  
41 also behoved mandatory surveys of populations implicated for relocation for the purpose of  
42 relocation assistance (Hartman, 1980). However, the extent of the more dispersed  
43 gentrification-induced displacement which urban scholars began to take note of (in the UK in  
44 the 1960s and in the US in the 1970s) was not officially recorded in a similar manner. This  
45 hampered accurate enumeration of the number of households affected by gentrification-induced  
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58 <sup>3</sup> Variation in the recording of clearance data appears to revolve around a lack of clarity on  
59 whether figures are for buildings or "dwelling spaces".  
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3 displacement and led to contested estimates as to its extent (Grier and Grier, 1978;  
4 Hartman, 1979; Sumka, 1979; Gale, 1979). This appeared to be related to markedly opposing  
5 views on gentrification, with those lauding the positive benefits of US inner city “revitalization”  
6 downplaying any negative impacts. Meanwhile, Marxist researchers, such as Smith (1979) were  
7 becoming increasingly concerned about the free market ideologies encouraging gentrification.  
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13 At this point in time, empirical studies into gentrification-induced displacement in the US began  
14 to emerge, mostly focused on single cities or neighbourhoods (Lee and Hodge, 1984; LeGates  
15 and Hartman, 1986). Some - including Clay (1979) and Gale (1980) - described distinct phases  
16 of early, accelerating and maturing gentrification, each associated with varying degrees of  
17 displacement. The definition of displacement used here involved the forced relocation of  
18 residents from their residential housing unit, a definition originating from the definition of a  
19 ‘displaced person’ used in the US Uniform Relocation Act, enacted for the purpose of state  
20 compensation (US Dept of Housing and Urban Development, 2017). Referring to this  
21 conceptualisation, Grier and Grier (1978: 8) suggested ‘displacement occurs when any  
22 household is forced to move from its residence by conditions which affect the dwelling or its  
23 immediate surroundings’, and which:  
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- 26 i. ‘Are beyond the household's reasonable ability to control or prevent;
- 27 ii. Occur despite the household's having met all previously-imposed conditions  
28 of occupancy;
- 29 iii. Make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable’.

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40 The latter point was connected to the high rate of abandoned property in formerly disinvested  
41 US inner city neighbourhoods that had been left to decay during the recession of the 1970s  
42 (Wallace and Wallace, 1990). The Griers' definition covers failure of the landlord to provide  
43 basic amenities (maintenance, heat, light), the influence of health and safety hazards, and  
44 sudden increases in rent which make the property unaffordable to that tenant - but not defaults  
45 on rent, breaches of contract or ‘voluntary’ moves. However, Grier and Grier (1978) highlighted  
46 that it is often difficult to discern the difference between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ migration.  
47 This noted, most early studies of gentrification-induced displacement attempted to enumerate  
48 the number of residents *forced* out of their neighbourhoods, these studies mainly involved  
49 gathering data about migrant (mover) characteristics through interviews (Gale, 1980; LeGates  
50 and Hartman, 1986). By way of example, Hodge (1981) combined findings from a city-wide  
51 survey in Seattle in 1978 (n=1,269) with private (Polk) US census tract data for 1973, 1976 and  
52 1977. Hodge questioned outmigrants retrospectively about their reasons for moving, noting that  
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3 gathering data from recollection can be prone to inaccuracies given the time lapsed since  
4 moving, possibly including post-move rationalisations. Moreover, the number of interviews  
5 appeared insufficient for robust statistical analysis when broken down by key variables (tenure,  
6 age, income, ethnicity, and categories for moving, etc). An additional problem was gauging  
7 whether the resultant 'displacement rate' for Seattle was high or low as no appropriate  
8 comparator area(s) had been identified (see Freeman, 2005; Freeman et al., 2016). Indeed,  
9 studies of displacement rates between different cities has often been hampered by variation in  
10 definitions of displacement, as well as by differences in city attributes and population size  
11 (Hodge, 1981: 193-194).  
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20 Subsequently, more attention has been directed towards theorizing diverse processes of  
21 gentrification-induced displacement, with the work by Marcuse (1986) especially significant in  
22 distinguishing between different forms of *direct* and *indirect* displacement (including  
23 exclusionary displacement) as summarised and updated in Table 1. Marcuse (1986: 156-57)  
24 suggested comparison of available housing units at two time points (before and after  
25 gentrification had started) could take account of excluded properties by measuring the pool of  
26 available dwellings. However, he argued that allowance needed to be made for variation in the  
27 number of dwellings due to ongoing change in the interim period (e.g. through new-build, infill  
28 and conversion). A further implication of exclusionary displacement is that poorer households  
29 may become 'trapped' in their current housing as the pool of options available to them in the  
30 local area decreases. Poorer owner-occupier households such as elderly householders may also  
31 incur increased costs of residing in areas of rising house-prices through increases in tax on their  
32 more valuable properties (Martin and Beck, 2018).  
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51 Marcuse's (1986) work also stressed the importance of measuring *displacement*  
52 *pressure* - when residents in the neighbourhood are negatively affected by the displacement  
53 occurring around them, such as the loss of outmigrating neighbours and friends, local shops  
54 changing hands to being run by or for social "others", the downgrading of services, and other  
55 environmental changes. Acknowledging such factors takes fuller account of the social and  
56 psychological aspects of neighbourhood change by encompassing the perceived loss of local  
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3 support networks through outmigration, as well as the disappearance of familiar local  
4 community services/facilities. Subsequent studies of neighbourhood change, especially those  
5 emphasising the impact of changes in the nature of retail and leisure facilities, identify this as a  
6 significant spur to gentrification and population displacement. Marcuse (1986) suggested that  
7 the measurement of displacement should encompass quantification at multiple spatial scales.  
8 He also recognised, however, that it would be extremely difficult for large areas. For example,  
9 in order to determine the level of involuntary migration, one must identify which out-migrations  
10 were voluntary, something that would mean tracing and interviewing *all* migrants/displacees,  
11 which is of course unlikely to be feasible across a large area.  
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20 In this regard, others have similarly highlighted the difficulty of trying to measure a  
21 phenomenon that may entail following-up households who have disappeared from their former  
22 location, and, as noted by Baeten et al., these households may be averse to participating in  
23 official surveys:  
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28 ‘The precarious housing situations of displaced people, people doubling up with others,  
29 etcetera, often exist outside official records, and, when traced, these people are not  
30 necessarily willing to ‘be interviewed’ about their troublesome life trajectories’ (Baeten  
31 et al., 2017: 635).  
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36 This serves to illustrate some of the key problems in the measurement of displacement, and the  
37 lack of comparable data which continues to plague this research area. Equally, some researchers  
38 have proceeded with notions of displacement that appear ill-suited for measuring enforced  
39 moves. For example Lyons (1996: 43) - despite noting that ‘migration is not synonymous with  
40 displacement’ - proceeded to conflate the two, suggesting that wealthier households who *choose*  
41 to move as an economic investment strategy ‘are economically displaced in another sense  
42 because they cannot improve their circumstances within the neighbourhood’. This turns on its  
43 head the fundamental point that displacement is *involuntary* - a process which behoves  
44 households to move/migrate for reasons *outwith* their control (see Grier and Grier 1978;  
45 Hartman, 1980; Marcuse, 1986; Atkinson, 2000). Here, it is important to stress that most  
46 migration involving ‘better- off households making housing and investment choices’ (Lyons  
47 1996:44) is not displacement but outmigration motivated by financial gain.  
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58 Many authors have then sought to measure evidence of displacement by researching population  
59 *and* neighbourhood change. Here, differences in the demographic and socio-economic  
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3 characteristics of immigrants and outmigrants in a particular area are examined to identify  
4 instances where one (usually lower/poorer) sub-group has been supplanted by another, often  
5 younger and more advantaged tranche of the population (via a process of succession) (van  
6 Criekingen, 2009). There are major problems here given a causal connection is not established  
7 - the immigration (of younger, more educated, childless singles and/or couples) may not have  
8 *caused* (or displaced) out-migration (of older people, poorer households and/or families). It is,  
9 for example, possible that older people are choosing to leave the inner city to move to a  
10 retirement community, and an influx of twenty and thirty-somethings are succeeding them.  
11 Indeed, Hamnett (2003) has argued that it is population replacement rather than displacement  
12 which has occurred in London as a result of the post-industrial restructuring of employment,  
13 the economy and the housing market - a distinction that has remained extremely difficult to  
14 prove within the confines of the available data<sup>4</sup>. A further issue is that in the absence of  
15 longitudinal data on individual income, it is not possible to say if reductions in the numbers of  
16 the poorest is because of their outmigration or the fact they may have benefitted from the  
17 general socio-economic uplift of an area (Atkinson, 2000; Ellen and O'Regan, 2011).  
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31 In contrast to studies of direct displacement, Liu et al. (2017) note that studies of indirect  
32 displacement are rare. An exception is the San Francisco City and Council Board on  
33 Displacement in the Mission District, which provides evidence of *exclusionary displacement*  
34 (Brousseau, 2015). The City of San Francisco has been subject to numerous waves of  
35 gentrification from the growth of gayborhoods in the 1970s through to the 'Tech Booms' of the  
36 1990s and contemporary gentrifications linked to an explosion of internet start-ups and  
37 relocations from Silicon Valley (Opillard, 2015). Brousseau (2015) analysed US decennial  
38 Census and American Community Survey (5-year pooled) data, estimating that the significant  
39 change in the proportion of high income households in the Mission district 2000-13 was  
40 associated with a 48% increase in owner-occupation (38% more than the citywide figure) and  
41 inflated rents due to high demand/low supply, which fuelled a disparity in rent-to-income ratios  
42 favouring the top fifth of earners. It was estimated that the median citywide market rent  
43 applicable in the Mission district would be unaffordable to 81% of households in the district  
44 based on local income data (i.e. housing costs of more than 30% of the household's income).  
45 Subtracting new-build properties, 5% of housing stock was estimated to have changed tenure  
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58 <sup>4</sup>For critiques of Hamnett's replacement thesis, see Watt (2008) plus Davidson and Wyly  
59 (2012).  
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3 from rental to owner-occupied by 2013, decreasing the pool of dwellings available to renters.  
4 Although no causal link could be established to direct displacement, a significant reduction of  
5 the Latino population (-27%) and family households with children (-26%) occurred in the  
6 Mission District during the same period, and a 28% increase in households comprising  
7 unrelated (non-Latino) individuals (the Latino population had previously comprised 60% of the  
8 Mission District in 2000, and rose by 13% across the whole of San Francisco City during this  
9 period). Although data from the American Community Survey at smaller scales (e.g. the  
10 individual census tract) is severely limited due to the nature of the survey, this suggests it can  
11 be used to estimate levels of exclusionary displacement through measures of tenurial change  
12 and affordability (see also DeVerteuil and Manley, 2017, on the exclusionary displacement  
13 caused by the super-rich in inner London).  
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24 Millard-Ball's (2002) 'whole-market' approach proceeds from a slightly different spatial  
25 perspective, with the impact of aggregate migration flows of displacees to destination areas also  
26 taken into account. This stresses a sudden increase in housing demand in neighbouring low-  
27 income areas may drive rent rises which will have the knock-on effect of displacing the poorest  
28 from those areas through both direct economic and exclusionary displacement. This type of  
29 'chain effect' is described by Liu et al. (2017) following the 'price-shadowing' of redevelopment  
30 schemes in Shenzhen, China. Here, the construction of new, large-scale (high-rise) gated  
31 community projects on 'village-in-the-city' sites has displaced low income (rural) migrant  
32 renters, which has in turn rippled out creating a property hotspot due to the increased local  
33 housing demand from displacees who wish to continue living in the neighbourhood. This has  
34 led to increased rents and overcrowding in remaining affordable areas for migrant worker-  
35 renters and, once all their resources are exhausted, some have no option but to leave the city.  
36 This stresses that direct forms of displacement entwine with indirect forms of displacement  
37 such as exclusionary displacement. However, a 'whole system' approach to researching the  
38 chain effect of displacement is difficult to operationalize (Liu et al., 2017). In part, this is  
39 because of the complex chorographies of displacement: Zhang and He (2018: 135) have  
40 suggested that 'gentrification-induced displacement not only links to the very moment when an  
41 [*involuntary displacement*] eviction takes place', but also relates to the temporalities 'before, in  
42 the midst of, and after the eviction', providing a particular challenge for the quantification of  
43 displacement.  
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### **Time, space and displacement**

The economic position of households is not static, but subject to change over time (Vigdor, 2002; Ellen and O'Regan, 2011). Poor households may cycle in and out of poverty, and household income may increase with economic upturns, individual age or household stage (e.g. young family, mature empty nest, etc). The reverse is also true of course - stage of life and life events such as relationship fractures, illness and unemployment may result in downward social mobility and moves to poorer areas through loss of income (Airey, 2003; Desmond and Gershenson, 2017). However, few studies of displacement incorporate life events or 'shocks' - such as losing a job, being made redundant or a relationship split (but see Desmond and Gershenson, 2017).

The concept of 'duration dependence' alludes to the relationship between the likelihood (also known as the 'risk' or 'hazard') of moving out and duration of residence. Generally, the probability of moving may be affected by the duration of stay up to that point: the longer residents stay in place, the more cumulative investment and commitment they might have to their neighbourhood (Gordon and Molho, 1995; Thomas et al., 2016). Although this may at first appear to apply to residents who have a choice about moving, such as owner-occupiers, the length of residence in private-rented accommodation may also affect a private landlord's propensity to inflate the rent to unaffordable levels, or evict in cases where residents have reliable long-standing records of rent payment (Desmond and Gershenson, 2017: 369).

In such cases the so-called 'hazard rate' of outmigration may increase steeply at first, peak early and then decrease over time, producing a hill-shaped distribution (Gordon and Molho, 1995; Thomas et al., 2016). This characteristic of the shape of the underlying hazard function requires the selection of a statistically appropriate model that allows for this specific form of distribution (Pryce and Gibb, 2006). Although Freeman and Braconi (2004) include 'years in current residence' as a simple linear variable in their logistic regression model, this fails to allow for the nonlinear relationship between length of residence and time, and may produce misleading results. A survival model based on an appropriate distribution of the hazard function of outmigration would possibly have been more appropriate.

Such issues about timing intersect with ones concerning the lack of data available at different points in time. For example, when Sullivan began to explore the mass eviction of mobile home residents from privately-owned 'trailer' parks in the US, she complained 'The lack of data

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3 makes it impossible to paint a comprehensive picture of... evictions nationwide'  
4 (<https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/09/the-other-affordable-housing-crisis/406405/>; see  
5 also Sullivan, 2017a,b). Sullivan (2017b) managed to use changes in land-use codes from  
6 county tax data at three-yearly intervals to identify and map mass evictions related to the closure  
7 of mobile home parks built on private land in Houston/Harris County. Using spatial analytical  
8 techniques in GIS such as Getis-Ord hotspot and nearest-neighbour analysis, Sullivan detected  
9 clusters of mobile home parks around the periphery of urban development in the county.  
10 Although she found no association with change-of-use variables such as new-build apartment  
11 blocks, mixed-use developments or condominiums that might indicate the direct impact of  
12 nearby gentrification, she identified a trend of displacement of trailer parks from the urban core  
13 to land beyond the urban periphery where land values are cheaper. This vulnerability through  
14 direct exposure to the vagaries of the land market and dispersion from city centres suggests an  
15 indirect 'chain effect' of displacement, which may require analysis through the framework of a  
16 'whole housing market approach' (Millard-Ball, 2002).  
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28 Given the nature of gentrification-related displacement, the spatial lens (or scale) through which  
29 we view and analyse this phenomenon also determines what we see. The spatial scale used in  
30 quantitative studies of displacement<sup>5</sup> varies from the meso- (thousands, tens of thousands)  
31 through to the macro (cities and countries, hundreds of thousands), but rarely the micro  
32 (individuals, tens). In empirical terms, Henig (1980) suggested studies which measured  
33 displacement at the macro city-scale, such as those focusing on suburb-to-city migration, risked  
34 missing critical variation occurring *within* cities at the neighbourhood level. Use of much larger  
35 districts (e.g., Freeman and Braconi, 2004) potentially excludes important variations at smaller  
36 spatial scales (Wong, 2004; Reardon et al., 2008; Johnston et al., 2016a,b). In many cases, it  
37 appears important to measure at even higher resolutions - down to block or street level (Hammel  
38 and Wyly, 1996; Opillard, 2015). For example, Hedin et al.'s (2012) study of Stockholm was at  
39 the scale of 100m square cells.  
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50 Aside from the difficulty of resolving within-zone displacements, there are additional well-  
51 known problems with the use of aggregate spatial data and derived statistical models. First,  
52 boundaries change over time and this precludes the simple comparison of counts of individuals,  
53 households or dwellings within these spatial areas (Openshaw, 1984). The second is that  
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58 <sup>5</sup> By way of contrast qualitative studies of gentrification-induced displacement have tended to  
59 be at a smaller spatial scale, often neighbourhood, even street based.  
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3 statistical relationships in spatial data vary by geographical scale, i.e. according to the size of  
4 the spatial unit - the classic Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (Openshaw and Taylor, 1979). A  
5 further issue when modelling with spatial data is the fact that phenomena (people, housing  
6 stock, income) tend to be more similar the closer they are to one another. This is known as  
7 “within-area homogeneity” (Tranmer and Steel, 1998), which violates the theoretical  
8 assumption of the randomness or independence of observations which underpins the many  
9 methods of estimating regression models such as ordinary least squares. This violation of  
10 randomness is known in statistical terms as autocorrelation. One method of dealing with this is  
11 to use multilevel modelling, which takes account of statistical autocorrelation by grouping  
12 individual observations (values) at different spatial scales such as block/street, output area/tract,  
13 borough, etc. Tranmer and Steel (2001) explored the effect of failing to nest individual residents  
14 within hierarchical spatial units using UK census data at the level of individuals within  
15 enumeration districts (small areas) within wards (meso-level). They demonstrated that if the  
16 middle level (ward) was excluded, effects at that level were redistributed to other levels of the  
17 model - leading to inaccurate coefficients (results). Freeman (2005) used a discrete-time binary  
18 logistic regression to model individual migration into census tracts. Like many authors working  
19 on displacement he does not discuss the theory underpinning the choice of spatial scale at which  
20 displacement should be measured, or explore the advantages of using smaller, block-group units  
21 (Hammel and Wyly, 1996). Furthermore, although Freeman (2005: 468) uses a ‘person-year’  
22 format, he takes no account of the clustering of individuals *within* neighbourhoods. In another  
23 example, Desmond and Gershenson (2017) use a *discrete-time* model to analyse the  
24 relationships between eviction and a range of individual, social network and neighbourhood  
25 factors. However, although time (in months) is clustered within individuals, this does not allow  
26 for the social similarity of individuals living in the same small area - i.e. the ‘block-group’ (their  
27 proxy for neighbourhood) – within census tracts (the larger unit used to represent the gentrified  
28 area). This means the model does not take account of socio-spatial autocorrelation.  
29 Unfortunately, Desmond and Gershenson (2017) give a very limited description of their  
30 methodology and do not include the type of model estimation (which is assumed to be logistic  
31 regression as they report a pseudo- $R^2$  and binary dependent variable). This is important because  
32 the underlying distribution should be matched to the shape of the hazard function for the risk  
33 of eviction.

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58 Relatively few studies have employed multilevel modelling to study gentrification- induced  
59 displacement. Liu et al. (2017) used it to test the indirect ‘price-shadowing’ effect associated  
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3 with urban redevelopment of high status gated communities in Shenzhen, China. Martin and  
4 Beck (2018) likewise used a hierarchical linear model to explore the impact of rising housing  
5 costs - such as local property taxes - on the propensity of home-owners to move or be displaced.  
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7 Their study is a methodological improvement on Freeman's (2005) in two ways. Firstly, it used  
8 a hierarchical (multilevel) model to allow for spatial autocorrelation at different scales by  
9 clustering 'individuals within [US] Census tracts within counties within states' (Martin and  
10 Beck, 2018: 43); and secondly, because they model data for renters separately from home-  
11 owners, which is important because residents in these tenures are likely to have very different  
12 patterns of duration of residence and 'risks' of displacement over time (Withers, 1997). The  
13 close relationship between length of residence and risk of moving means that 'survival models'  
14 which take into account the pattern of the likelihood of moving might ultimately be more  
15 appropriate.  
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### 24 **The problems of data availability**

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26 Most quantitative studies of gentrification-induced displacement have employed national  
27 censuses and/or local survey data - data that come with significant limitations in terms of  
28 revealing actual patterns of intra-urban migration and displacement. In some cases these  
29 limitations cannot be easily disconnected from governmental interests given gentrification  
30 appears to have become an official tool of urban policy (Herrera et al., 2007; Lees et al, 2016;  
31 Baeten et al., 2017). As the majority of studies covered in this review have originated from the  
32 US and the UK, sources of data from these countries are the focus here, although the issues  
33 raised may be generalizable to other national contexts (e.g. see Bernt and Holm, 2009;  
34 Posthumus et al, 2012). The key statistical sources of data are briefly outlined below, noting  
35 their advantages and disadvantages for measuring displacement.  
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44 Census data has been the key source of demographic and housing data in many countries  
45 including the US and UK. Invariably, the utility of such periodic data collection for inferring  
46 displacement depends not only on the currency of the data, but also the salience of the questions  
47 asked: for example, the omission of data relating to household income, rent or house prices in  
48 the UK census has long-frustrated attempts to explore housing affordability. Likewise key data  
49 sources such as the US Annual Housing Survey, described by Hodge (1981: 194) as 'the most  
50 comprehensive source of intraurban migration' at the time, failed to include rent increases and  
51 other housing costs (Cousar, 1978). In contrast, the *American Community Survey* (ACS) - a  
52 rolling sample survey - includes questions on rent and monthly mortgage payments, with a high  
53 response rate (over 92% in 2015). Irrespective, census products are typically only available in  
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3 aggregate form at a range of geographies, often built up from small area building blocks such  
4 as the UK's Output Area (OA) of 300 people (ONS, nd). Such aggregation presents well-known  
5 problems, as noted above.  
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9 Similarly, we have stated that when tracing displacement, tracking change over time can be  
10 important. This suggests that longitudinal data sources may be of more value than snapshots  
11 taken at a given point. The *England and Wales Longitudinal Study* provides an example,  
12 comprising the linked records of a 1% sample of the census population longitudinally.  
13 However, the lack of a full migration history for individuals in this dataset is a particular  
14 problem for the study of displacement (Atkinson, 2000). An alternative is the *British Household  
15 Panel Study (BHPS)*, a longitudinal panel which began with 5,050 households in Britain in 1991  
16 (later integrated into the larger Understanding Society panel survey). However, the comparative  
17 newness of this dataset on top of the limitations of longitudinal data where spatial extent is  
18 sacrificed for temporal resolution, means this lacks the sample size necessary for robust  
19 analysis: findings cannot be verified or tested using ground-truthing within the specific spatio-  
20 temporal contexts of gentrification (Hammel and Wyly, 1996). Nonetheless, the BHPS has been  
21 used by Freeman et al (2016) to estimate displacement at a local authority level.  
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33 In the US, Freeman (2005) used *The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)*, a longitudinal  
34 panel study of 5,000 families which began in 1968. This included an 'over-sample' of 1,872  
35 poorer families, which have a known higher attrition rate from longitudinal surveys. The  
36 collection of housing data did not begin until 1986, and an oversample from three major groups  
37 in the Latino population was added in 1990 but then dropped in 1995 due to a shortage of  
38 funding and the complexity of representativeness with regards to the Latino diaspora  
39 (McGonagle et al., 2012). Like other national panel studies, the PSID is good for studying  
40 lifecourse issues, but comprises such a small sample (c. 0.01% of the US population) that it  
41 does not have the statistical power to provide robust analyses at the small area level. *The  
42 American Housing Survey*, which began in 1973, is a biennial sample survey of housing units  
43 (occupied or vacant) which asks occupants or landlords about the dwelling unit (size, condition  
44 etc), and household characteristics such as composition, income and housing costs (US Census  
45 Bureau, 2017). The survey is cross-sectional and does not provide data on change over time at  
46 the level of housing unit: therefore it cannot be used to measure rent variation, length of stay,  
47 household income change, etc. The limited sample size also precludes analysis at the small area  
48 level such as the census tract, a problem with comparable sources in the UK (e.g. the English  
49 Housing Survey - which began later in 1993).  
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3 As we move into an era of 'open government', there is potential for several national sources of  
4 administrative data to become available for research. In the UK, for example, those datasets  
5 collated by the Department for Work and Pensions deserve investigation, notably the Work and  
6 Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS), which comprises data sourced from in-house  
7 administrative systems such as Job Centres and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC).  
8 This consists of multiple records per individual which can potentially be linked to create a  
9 longitudinal record of their work, benefits, and pension history. Each recorded spell contains a  
10 start and end date and the individual's address. Although these may not always be up-to-date,  
11 this data has the distinct advantage that it covers *all* state benefit claimants, pensioners and  
12 people paying taxes. This longitudinal microdata on individuals could potentially provide  
13 individual histories of changing income and residential mobility, which could be used to analyse  
14 the relationship between benefits or pension status, income and potential economic  
15 displacement from homes through, for example, changes in circumstances such as job-loss.  
16 Benefit and tax credit data could also potentially be used to give insight into the proportion of  
17 income that poorer people in London are paying in housing costs given Housing Benefit and  
18 other means-tested benefits entail an assessment of the household's income and outgoings,  
19 including rent. Therefore, housing benefit data, readily available at the Borough level, can  
20 indicate shifts in the numbers of those in housing need, with this data suggesting patterns of  
21 movement inner to outer London amongst those in the private-rented sector (Powell, 2015).  
22 Were such data available at more granular spatial scales it would be possible to investigate the  
23 relationship between benefit changes such as the 'bedroom tax', gentrification and residential  
24 displacement.

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43 Given the limitations of national datasets, several studies have attempted to use local surveys  
44 instead. For example, Freeman and Braconi (2004) used the *New York City Housing Vacancy*  
45 *Survey* to measure displacement (noting New York had implemented some form of rent control  
46 or 'rent stabilisation' since 1943). This longitudinal survey takes the dwelling as its unit of  
47 measurement on a three-yearly basis. Although Freeman and Braconi (2004) state that this  
48 measures mobility, the fact that the focus is on individual *dwellings* rather than *households*  
49 means that it cannot be used to study migration and mobility into and out of the city. Moreover,  
50 a three-year period cannot capture more rapid change. Desmond and Gershenson (2017) used  
51 the *Milwaukee Area Renters Study* to research associations between individual, neighbourhood  
52 and social network factors and the risk of eviction. This detailed face-to-face household survey  
53 from 2009-11 covered issues such as city living, housing and low-income groups, based on a  
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3 sample of 1,086 households living in the private-rented sector, stratified by ethnic group. The  
4 response rate was high (over 83%), probably due to the direct contact method of administration.  
5 Homeowners were excluded and the data was supplemented with over 100 evictions from legal  
6 cases within the previous two years. A particular strength of this survey for displacement studies  
7 is the two-year residential address history taken for each lead householder. These were  
8 geocoded and linked to 2,010 block groups (a neighbourhood proxy comprising approximately  
9 1,135 residents per unit, about a quarter of the size of a US census tract).

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17 Studies from other countries demonstrate the importance of different types of data as yet  
18 unavailable in the UK or US. Shin (2009), for example, includes a table detailing the high  
19 proportion of absentee landlords compared to (low income) owner-occupiers in a district of  
20 Seoul in 2000, and describes how this imbalance of speculators versus local residents is critical  
21 in driving the interests of capital in the redevelopment process. Data in this case was sourced  
22 from the local government Housing Bureau in Seoul. Given the recent growth of studies of  
23 gentrification outside of the Global North, it will be interesting to see what similar data sources  
24 are available to help quantify gentrification-induced displacement in other contexts.

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32 Creative, lateral-thinking may then play an important role in filling gaps in data. For example,  
33 in the study mentioned earlier mapping the mass displacement of mobile home residents due to  
34 the closure of privately-owned trailer parks, Sullivan (2017a) noted that while these mass  
35 eviction events could not be traced through the courts (because they were not legally  
36 challenged), they were recorded in state administrative data through changes in land-use codes,  
37 which could subsequently be mapped using GIS. The use of eviction data from court case  
38 records has though been a developing trend amongst housing activists, scholar-activists and  
39 concerned non-statutory organisations. In San Francisco, for example, the Anti-Eviction  
40 Mapping Project is an activist-led project which seeks to document the ongoing displacement  
41 of lower income tenants in the San Francisco area. Relevant data on evictions, rent- levels,  
42 illegal holiday lets (AirB&B) and displacement practices is gathered through a range of largely  
43 *unofficial* sources such as the San Francisco Rent Board, provider organisations of Legal Aid  
44 and Services, public websites (eg. Rent Jungle, 2018), online crowdsourced surveys (see Anti-  
45 Eviction Mapping Project, 2018; Project, 2018), and oral histories from local residents and  
46 evicted tenants (demonstrating the importance of mixed, quantitative and qualitative methods).

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60 In the UK, The London Tenants' Federation, Lees, Just Space and SNAG (2014) mapped

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3 displacement from the now demolished Heygate Estate in London using their in-depth  
4 knowledge of, and contacts on, the estate. This work was advanced in the Aylesbury Estate  
5 CPO Public Inquiries in 2015 and 2018 when further quantification and mapping was  
6 undertaken using displacement data from Notting Hill Housing Association (the developer) and  
7 Freedom of Information requests sent to Southwark Council (see Hubbard and Lees, 2018; Lees  
8 and Hubbard, forthcoming). There are now a number of groups mapping displacement from  
9 gentrifying council estates across London using data from a variety of sources, including  
10 Freedom of Information requests, borough data, developer data, reports from think tanks, and  
11 on-the-ground information from council estate residents and activists working with them (e.g.  
12 Concrete Action; the London Tenants Federation; Architects for Social Housing, etc)<sup>6</sup>. Sharing  
13 and cross-referencing of this data is key to providing robust quantitative evidence of  
14 displacement. Indeed, organisations such as justMap (see <http://justplace-londonblogspotcouk/>)  
15 collect spatial justice crowdsource data online and organise 'public workshops at community  
16 events or festivals to collect *intelligence on the city* directly from Londoners'.

## 27 **Conclusion**

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31 The question of quantifying displacement has long vexed gentrification researchers, yet it is  
32 incredibly important in the fight against gentrification. Gentrification-induced displacement has  
33 been recognised since Glass (1964) first identified the displacement of former (working class)  
34 residents as a defining feature of gentrification. Nevertheless, progress in quantifying its extent  
35 has been remarkably slow. This is due, in part, to the contested identification of neighbourhoods  
36 undergoing gentrification, as well as the more obvious difficulties of tracking displacees using  
37 available datasets. In relation to the former, it is evident that gentrification occurs unevenly  
38 across time and space (Lees et al., 2008; Lees et al., 2015,2016), implying that its multi-  
39 dimensional complexity is best operationalised using several variables in order to distinguish it  
40 from other contemporaneous processes of neighbourhood uplift. However, ground-truthing  
41 suggests there are always problems in identifying gentrification-induced displacement at a  
42 meso-level (such as the scale of individual census tracts), due to the piecemeal nature of  
43 gentrification, particularly in its early stages. Such problems are exacerbated by studying sub-

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55 <sup>6</sup> See <https://www2.le.ac.uk/projects/estate-renewal/>;  
56 <https://www.concreteaction.net/>; <http://www.londontenants.org/> (especially  
57 their analysis of dwelling stock in London);  
58 <https://architectsfor-socialhousing.wordpress.com/>.

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3 neighbourhood change across spatial units that are simply too large. Such debate, however, is  
4 specific to classic gentrification that involves incremental changes over time, and ignores the  
5 increasing presence of state-led gentrification which is more often than not at a mega-scale and  
6 faster speed in both the global North and the global South (see Lees et al, 2015,2016).  
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8 Quantifying gentrification-induced displacement in cities of the global South will, no doubt,  
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10 throw up the same and different issues. Quantifying displacement from slum-gentrification in  
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12 the global South, for example, is difficult due to a lack of formal or robust data on who lives in  
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14 informal settlements; and of course this makes it easier for the state to enact slum gentrification  
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16 and obfuscate the number of displacees (see Doshi, 2015).  
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21 Our review also suggests that analysis needs to take a 'long view' in order to capture the  
22 accumulation of change unfolding within specific neighbourhoods (see Sims, 2016). Studies  
23 which only reference two 'snapshots' of an area – e.g. at time-points a decade apart - may fail  
24 to adequately depict processes of urban change, unless these coincide with specific phases of  
25 urban development such as Tech Boom 2.0 in San Francisco (Opillard, 2015; Brousseau, 2015)  
26 or the state-led gentrification of council estates in London (Lees, 2014). Even in these cases,  
27 changes at the micro-level of blocks and streets appear best ground-truthed by local experts.  
28 Given the risk of mis-identifying neighbourhoods as gentrifying, this seems to be an essential  
29 part of the analytical process, although novel use of digital data products such as Google Street  
30 View offers a less labour-intensive alternative (see, for example, Hwang and Sampson, 2014  
31 and Ilic et al, 2019, on using deep learning computer-based vision techniques). Ultimately,  
32 visual proxies like the make and age of cars on a given street may not be the best identifier of  
33 gentrification, but the ability to automatically analyse large numbers of images compiled over  
34 a number of years seems to offer an efficient means of registering where socio-economic change  
35 is occurring.  
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49 However, most important of all in a displacement context is access to viable sources of data  
50 enabling the tracking of individuals through space and across time. Until such data are collected  
51 or made available, the extent of residential gentrification-induced displacement will remain  
52 largely unrecorded and invisible. In the meantime, we appear reliant on proxies for actual  
53 displacement, such as broad indicators of population churn, changes in owner occupation, or  
54 changes in the ethnic and class make-up of particular neighbourhoods. While such measures  
55 can be suggestive of involuntary displacement occurring, they are rarely conclusive. Rather  
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3 than being measures of displacement per se, these are perhaps best thought of as measures of  
4 displacement pressure (Marcuse, 1986), or susceptibility to gentrification-induced migration  
5 (Chapple, 2009; Zuk and Chapple, 2016; Chapple et al, 2017).  
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10 The failures of 'official' statistics to reveal actual flows of displaced people at the urban scale  
11 suggests that, for the moment, we must then rely on a mixture of proxy measures,  
12 approximations and predictions that reveal tendencies but which cannot be relied upon to  
13 distinguish between involuntary displacement, voluntary outmigration or incumbent socio-  
14 economic uplift. The alternative is a form of 'data scavenging' that collates information from a  
15 variety of sources, including those collected via participatory methods or via analysis of social  
16 media data (e.g, Gibbons et al, 2018; Shelton et al, 2015; Zhou et al, 2015). These less  
17 conventional approaches to collating quantitative data on gentrification-induced displacement  
18 are growing in importance in an age of 'big data' and participatory GIS (Goodchild, 2007;  
19 Aubrecht et al., 2011, 2016). Obviously, there remain challenges here, particularly working  
20 with geotagged (point-referenced) information that can be used to reveal the existence of  
21 communities at different scales of resolution (Poorthuis, 2018): more important in the context  
22 of this discussion is whether changes in the location of someone's social media activity  
23 indicates a change in residential location. Yet given the difficulties, failures and limitations of  
24 conventional quantitative studies of gentrification-induced displacement outlined in this paper,  
25 and the urgency of collating robust evidence about displacement in an era of planetary  
26 gentrification, it might be time to move beyond conventional census-based measures. Perhaps,  
27 then, big data will provide the evidence we seek. But talking about the advantages of machine  
28 and data driven modelling over linear analysis, two approaches conceptually related but  
29 different in practice, is akin to discussing the advantages of interviews over say archival  
30 research: they are two tools, the best one depends on what one's aims are (see  
31 <https://normaldeviate.wordpress.com/2012/06/12/statistics-versus-machine-learning-5-2/>). As  
32 Harris et al. (2017) note: 'For the geocomputation community, the potential lies in Big *Spatial*  
33 Data, and the opportunities to harness the increasing number of open data initiatives, new forms  
34 of data generated by citizens, the near ubiquitous capture of location, and the near permanent  
35 connectivity via web-enabled devices that allow data to be shared and uploaded'. But they warn  
36 against allowing the data to do its own talking as empirically and theoretically naïve, and assert  
37 that research questions need to be specified in advance. And critically, as the Data Justice Lab  
38 (<https://datajusticelab.org/>) make clear, we always need to consider questions of social justice  
39 in this new world of datafication and think about how we might best pursue 'data justice'.  
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**Table 1.** Displacement after Marcuse (source: Zhang and He, 2018, drawing on Marcuse, 1986).

|                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Direct last-resident displacement | Direct last-resident displacement is caused by both physical (e.g. harassment from landlords) and economic (e.g. rent increases) actions   |
| Direct chain displacement         | This sort of displacement is counted beyond 'direct last-resident displacement' and includes previous households dislocated due to the deterioration of a building or rent increases |
| Exclusionary displacement         | This kind of displacement means households have previously had access to housing but are unable to access any at a later stage because it has been gentrified or abandoned           |
| Displacement pressure             | Displacement pressure refers to the dispossession suffered by less affluent families during the transformation of the neighbourhoods where they live                                 |